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ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE SCIENCE OF 
"RACE" 
Brian Siegel 
The fixity of a habit is generally in direct proportion to its 
absurdity (Marcel Proust, Remembrance of Things Past). 
"Race" is not a black or white issue in. anthropology, 
certainly not for the last sixty years. Most anthropologists 
deny the existence of "biological races," but they all 
acknowledge the reality of "social races," and the tendency 
for people to deal with one another in terms of socially and 
culturally constructed racial categories. Forensic 
anthropologists, for example, measure bones to identify the 
race of unidentified skeletons, but their racial attributions 
are statistical inferences drawn from comparative skeletons 
of known social races. Such classifications vary across 
time and space, so American forensic anthropologists are 
best at identifying the social races recognized in America. 
And since social races are as often distinguished on the 
basis of their cultural as physical features, anthropologist 
Ashley Montagu (1942) has long insisted that races should 
properly be called "ethnic groups." 
The racial categories used by the federal Census Bureau 
are examples of "social races." While often based upon 
perceived physical differences, such perceptions have 
changed over time. The 1890 census was the only one 
which attempted to distinguish between mulattos (one-
half), quadroons (one-quarter), and octoroons (one-eighth 
black). And the 1920 census was the last one to 
distinguish mulattos from Negroes. The people who had 
once occupied these categories were still around, but the 
Bureau abandoned them as subjective and, in the case of 
mulattos, irrelevant, having decided that about 75 percent 
of the Negroes were of mixed origins anyway (Williamson 
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1980:112-14, 118). Similarly, Asian Indians have been 
classified as the Hindu race from 1920-1940, as White from 
1950-70, and as Asian or Pacific Islander since 1977 
' when the 1970 Hispanic racial category was dropped, and 
Spanish-speakers were tabulated separately under 
"Hispanic Origin (of any race)" (Wright 1994:50-52). 
The racial categories used by the federal government 
were set in 1977 by the Office of Management and 
Budget's Statistical Directive 15. It offers a choice of five 
broad racial categories: White (for people who are mostly 
pink)~ Black (for people who are mostly brown)~ American 
Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut (the Native American category)~ 
Asian or Pacific Islander (a uniquely American racial 
category)~ and Other (largely claimed by Latin Americans 
who reject the Black/White alternatives). These classifica-
tions are far from perfect, and the House Subcommittee 
which oversees the system is under pressure to change it. 
The Arab American Institute would like a new, non-White 
category for Middle Easterners, and native Hawaiians want 
to be moved from the Asian/Pacific Islander to the Native 
American category. Most contentious of all is the move-
ment to create a new Multiracial category for the children 
of interracial marriages. This, by undermining the current 
classification system, might pose serious problems for the 
apportionment of congressional districts, and for affirma-
tive action and civil rights regulatory programs. Clearly, 
the Census Bureau's racial categories are socially and 
culturally defined, and are as much about politics and 
money as about personal identity issues (Wright 1994). 
A characteristic feature of social races is their arbitrari-
ness. America used to recognize, as South Africa and most 
Latin American countries still do, a mixed (mulatto) race 
category of Coloreds or Creoles~ and such people had 
substantial communities in Charleston and New Orleans. 
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But under the racism and miscegenation fears of the late 
nineteenth century, mulattos had to either "pass" as whites 
or join with the Negroes. Many states then adopted the 
South's one-drop rule, meaning that a person with any 
African ancestry was defined as black, even though most 
"blacks" by then were really brown (Davis 1991; William~ 
son 1980). But the one-drop rule only applies to Afiican 
Americans and has never made a Native American out of 
someone with a Cherokee great-grandmother (even a 
princess). All this is peculiar to America. But so is the 
case of the Mississippi Chinese studied by James Loewen 
(1988), who were classified as blacks in the 1870s, and 
gradually became whites in the 1940s and 1950s. 
The racial categories used in American society take 
different forms in other countries (Davis 1991 :81-122). A 
white from the Dominican Republic is considered to be 
Colored in Jamaica, and to be black in America. A Mexi-
can Indian who wears Indian clothes and speaks an Indian 
language is an Indian, but one who opts for European 
clothes and speaking Spanish is a Ladino (mestizo). Brazil, 
like America, is a color-conscious society with a history of 
plantation slavery. And while Brazilians have some three 
dozen racial categories, and can assign the same person to 
different categories from day to day, their massive lower 
class tends to be populate9 with darker-skinned people. 
Yet their system of racial classification is not entirely color 
bound. "Money whitens," the Brazilians say, and a wealthy, 
dark-skinned person is a white. None of this makes any 
biological sense. But social races operate on the basis of 
sociocultural criteria rather than on biological facts. They 
justifY self-perpetuating differences in social rank and 
livelihood opportunities as if they were predetermined facts 
of nature. And this is because these socioculturally consti-
tuted categories are grounded in the ideology of distinct 
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biological races. 
The fact that most anthropologists--about 50 percent of 
the physical and 70 percent of the cultural anthropologists, 
according to a 1989 sutvey reported in Newsweek (Begley 
199 5: 67)--no longer accept "race" as a valid biological 
category is interesting in and of itself It is even more 
interesting, though, when contrasted with the fact that 
nineteenth century anthropology all but invented the idea 
of"race" (Cunningham 1908; Stocking 1968). Most of our 
current racial folklore derives from the "scientific racism" 
and armchair evolutionism of the nineteenth century 
anthropologists. Yet most of their twentieth century 
counterparts reject the idea of biological race(s), and even 
those who want to retain it seem uncertain about what to 
do with it. What happened here? What is the history of 
the biological notion of race, and why is that notion now 
generally rejected? 
Apart from Antarctica, our human ancestors had popu-
lated every continent on earth well before the end of the 
last Ice Age. Few species are as widely distributed across 
the globe. And, as with any widely distributed species, 
natural selection (or· environmental adaptation), random 
genetic drift (the tendency for the gene frequencies in 
small, isolated populations--for no adaptive reason--to 
rapidly diverge from those of their parental stock), and 
sexual selection ("survival of the chic-est," or preferential 
mating for attractive traits) combined to make us a widely 
varied species. Though these human differences are all 
based upon non-obsetvable genotypic variations, like the 
ones for the sickle cell trait and the various blood groups, 
we more often interact on the basis of such obsetvable, 
phenotypic variations as size, shape, and color differences. 
Humans have long been aware of phenotypic differences, 
but what they did with them varied from place to place. 
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The Rig-Veda from about 3000 B.C., for example, sug-
gests that color prejudice is no recent invention, for it tells 
how the Aryan invaders conquered and slew the dark-
skinned and "flat-nosed barbarians" of the. Indus River 
Valley. The ancient Egyptians were also color-conscious, 
for tomb paintings from as early as 1350 B.C. represent the 
Egyptians in red (though occasionally, black), and the 
Middle Easterners, Northerners (i.e., Europeans) ~nd 
Nubians in yellow, white, and black (Gossett 1963 :3-4). 
But the Egyptians ordinarily referred to thes~ peoples by 
geographical or political names, rather than by color. 
Recognizing physical differences does not require racial 
labels. Neither does it n~y entail "racism," the belief 
that such differences make some people innately inferior or 
superior to others. 
The biological meaning of "race" has changed over time. 
The word itself seems to have entered English around 1500 
from one of the Romance languages--probably French 
(race) or Spanish (raza)--to denote a breed, variety, nation, 
or descent-related line of creatures. Thus a dog or horse 
"of race" was a pedigree or thoroughbred creature, while 
"the race and stock of Abraham" meant the Jews or ancient 
Hebrews (Banton 1987:1-2). ' 
This same, varietal sense of race was applied to humans 
in the tenth edition of Carolus Linnaeus's (1707-78) 
Systema Naturae (System ofNature, 1758), the Swedish 
taxonomist's binomial catalogue of plant and animal life. 
Apart from two fanciful categories of humanity--the "wild" 
children abandoned in the forests, and a jumble of early ape 
lore and legendary men with tails--he identified four 
geographical varieties of Homo sapiens: the red (Native) 
Americans, white Europeans, pale Asians, and black 
Africans. Though his brief, one and two word descriptions 
of each variety's temperament, posture and governance 
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hint at unflattering stereotypes, Linnaeus offered a largely 
descriptive, non-hierarchical account of four geographical 
varieties of the human species. 
There were contrasting views of human differences by 
the late eighteenth century, when the debate began over 
just how different these human varieties were, and whether 
they were best explained in terms of one or separate 
creations (monogenesis vs. polygenesis). While the 
monogenists explained human varieties in terms of their 
divergent experiences since the time of creation, the 
polygenists considered them distinctly different species, 
each the product of its own separate (and unbiblical) 
creation. Some sense of these contrasting views is captured 
by comparing the ideas and attitudes of two contemporary 
monogenists, Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, a German 
medical professor and the father of physical anthropology, 
and Baron Georges Cuvier, the eminent French naturalist 
and the father of comparative anatomy and paleontology. 
The third edition ofBlumenbach's (1752-1840) Generis 
Humani Varietate Nativa (On the Native Varieties of the 
Human Genus, 1795) W'!S a particularly influential 
discussion of human varieties. He, "the least racist and 
most genial of all Enlightenment thinkers" (Gould 
1994b:67), rejected the polygenists' claim of separate 
creations and argued, instead, that his five human varieties 
were generated after people left their common origin place 
and adapted to different environments. Moreover, he saw 
the geographical distribution of human physical differences-
-he himself had tried and rejected hair forms and facial 
angles (Gossett 1963:70, 80)-as bein'g so gradual in nature 
as to defy any demarcation of discrete racial types. Thus, 
Blumenbach claimed, the very traits which many viewed as 
markers ofblacks' inferiority also exist, to varying degrees, 
among other human varieties. And to rebut the claim that 
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blacks were innately less intelligent than whites, he wrote 
about Benjamin Banneker, the African American mathe-
matical genius, and of his particular fondness, within his 
own special library of black authors, for the poetry of 
Phillis Wheatley. 
It is ironic, then, that Blumenbach imposed hierarchy 
upon the study of human varieties. Convinced that his 
Europeans were the most handsome and, thus; the original 
human variety, he renamed them "Caucasians" after the 
handsomest skull in his collection, that of a women from 
near Mt. Caucasus on the Georgian-Russian border. The 
other human varieties, through migration and environmen-
tal adaptation, were "degenerations" (meaning, "deriva-
tions") from that original white stock. There were, he 
reasoned, two main and two subsequent derivations, for a 
total of five varieties: one Caucasian line went off to 
become the brown Malays (including Australian aborigines, 
Melanesians and Polynesians), who gave rise to the black 
Ethiopians (Africans); another went off to become the red 
Americans, who later gave rise to the yellow Mongoloids 
(Asians). Thus while Blumenbach rejected the notion of 
separate biological races, his hierarchical, pseudo-evolu-
tionary scheme implied that some . varieties were purer, 
more original and handsome, than others (Gould 1994b; 
Banton 1987:5-6; Gossett 1963:37-39). And his scheme 
was easily misrepresented during this age of the trans-
Atlantic slave trade and growing color prejudice, as 
evidenced in Thomas Jefferson's Notes on Virginia (1786). 
Baron Cuvier {1769-1832), on the other hand, viewed 
such varieties or races as fixed and distinct physical types. 
An opponent of early evolutionary thought, the mutability 
of species, Cuvier invented catastrophism to reconcile the 
extinctions documented in the geological strata with his 
beliefin fixed, unalterable species. The earth, he said, had · 
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experienced a long series of natural "revolutions" or 
catastrophic environmental changes, after which the 
surviving members of the species in a given region left and 
were replaced by new, immigrant species. 
Just such a catastrophe, Cuvier believed, had driven 
Adam and Eve's descendants off into different, mutually 
isolated regions, resulting in a hierarchy of three fixed 
human types--the Caucasians on top, Mongoloids in the 
middle, and Ethiopians on the bottom--each with its own 
distinctive cultural and mental traits. Thus, Cuvier divided 
the human species into fixed geographical types, and used 
their physical differences to explain their cultural and 
(alleged) intellectual differences (Banton 1987:28-32). The 
race scientists of the nineteenth century shared Cuvier' s 
belief in a hierarchy of fixed racial types. But they sought 
measurable data to demonstrate it and, in their search, 
invented anthropometry, the measurement of living hu-
mans, and craniometry, the measurement of human heads 
and skulls. 
One of the earliest contributors to this "scientific racism" 
of the nineteenth century was the Philadelphia physician 
and paleontologist, Samuel George Morton (1799-1851 ). 
Morton was convinced that black and white Americans 
represented different, unalterable species, and that the 
blacks had been predestined for slavery since the days of 
ancient Egypt (Lorimer 1978:136). Given the mulatto 
presence in America, he was forced to temper the long-held 
polygenist claim that mulattos, like mules, were infertile. 
Separate species, Morton said, could indeed propagate 
fertile offspring, but the resulting racial hybrids suffer such 
diminished fertility that they eventually become extinct 
(Gosse~ 1963: 59; Lorimer 1978:132-33, 139-40; Stanton 
1960:66-68; Williamson 1980:73, 95). 
Seduced by the fallacious belief that brain or skull size 
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was an index of the capacity for civilization, Morton used 
pepper seed, lead shot and calibrated cylinders on 256 
skulls from his collection to determine the average cranial 
capacity for each of Blumenbach's five "races." His 
results, reported in an often copied, final footnote to his 
Crania Americana (1839), seemed to confirm the notion of 
a racial hierarchy of intelligence: Caucasians had the largest 
skulls; Mongolians, Americans and Malays had middle-
sized ones; and the Ethiopians had the smallest (Banton 
1987:34-37; Gossett 1963:73-74; Gould 1981:50-69; 
Stanton 1960:24-44). Upon Morton' s death, his two 
disciples, Josiah Clark Nott and George Robin Gliddon, 
gave even wider currency to the Euroamerican cause of 
polygenesist white supr.emacy with at least nine editions of 
their800-page TypesofMankind(1854) (Banton 1987:37-
45; Gossett 1963:64-65; Stanton 1960:45-53, 161-73). 
Apart from the fact that cranial capacity is a direct 
function ofbody size (males tend to have larger skulls than 
females; and Neanderthals had 10 percent larger crania than 
modem humans), Morton's results were predetermined by 
the skulls he selected for his sample. As his footnote 
clearly states, fourteen of his seventeen Hindu skulls and all 
ofhis Mexican and Peruvian.skulls were omitted from the 
Caucasian and American subsets because of their smallish 
size. He only obtained an acceptable American figure by 
including a number of Iroquois specimens which were, on 
average, 4.5 cubic inches larger than the average Caucasian 
skull. He reported the range of variation found within each 
of his racial categories, but was so focused upon the inter-
racial differences that he ignored the fact that his reported 
intra-racial differences ( 14 to 40 cubic inches) :were .far 
greater than those between racial categories (1 to 9 cubic 
inches). 
Harvard biologist Stephen Jay Gould has since reexam-
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ined Morton's skulls, remeasured his sample, and recalcu-
lated his figures. It turns out that Morton's Caucasians did 
not have a monopoly on the largest skulls, and that there 
was no significant difference (4 cubic inches, or 65.5 cubic 
centimeters) between his racial categories. Morton was 
wrong. But as he made no attempt to cover up his errors, 
he cannot be accused of fraud. Gould, instead, finds him 
guilty of "an a priori conviction about racial ranking so 
powerful that it directed his tabulations along preestab-
lished lines" (Gould 1981:69, 50-69; Banton 1987:34-37). 
By 1850, European and American ideas about human 
varieties assumed the existence of a hierarchy of fixed types 
based upon heritable physical and cultural traits. Such 
ideas were all but universal in the 1870s and 1880s. This 
change cannot be traced to the influence of any single racial 
theory or theorist, for, as historian Douglas Lorimer (1978) 
argues, the race scientists were following, rather than 
leading, popular opinion. Discussions about race in mid-
Victorian England were very political, focusing on social 
class and class mobility, and the question of white-non-
white equality made little sense when few thought that 
poor whites, the Irish, or the Jews, much less women, 
merited equal treatment. Citing anthropologist Ruth 
Benedict (1943), Lorimer concludes that the pattern of 
intense racial determinism and nationalism then found 
across Europe "was a common reaction to the increasingly 
antagonistic international climate and to the threatening 
political and social environment posed by the advance 
towards a more fully industrial, urban, and democratic 
order" (Lorimer 1978:209). Factor in the apologies for 
slavery and the attacks on immigration, and the same 
conclusion applies to America (Frederickson 1988; Wil-
liamson 1980:61-109). 
Most nineteenth century scholars, then, viewed races as 
I 
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pure and fixed human types, if not as separate species. 
Charles Darwin's (1809-1882) The Descent of Man (1871) 
was a partial exception, for while comfortable with the 
cultural distinction between "savage" and "civilized" 
peoples, and with the idea of racial extinctions and progres-
sion, Darwin generally used "race" in tenns of a non-
hierarchical series of varieties produced by sexual selection, 
and he saw no point in giving names to things he could not 
define. By arguing that all people were descended from the 
apes, he and Alfred Russell Wallace (1823-1913) made 
hash of the old monogenesis-polygenesis debate. But their 
approach did not satisfy most of their readers, who wanted 
to know which nice had derived from which ape, or which 
among the races was the most or least ape-like (Lorimer 
1978:142-45; Stepan 1982:56-82; Stocking 1968:110-32). 
These scientific racists were not only convinced that an 
evolutionary hierarchy of fixed racial types existed in 
nature, but that Darwin's own natural selection (or Herbert 
Spencer's "survival of the fittest") had created it. As 
scientists, however, they went in search of measurable data 
to prove it. They studied skin color, hair fonns, facial 
angles, the ratio of lower to upper ann length, autopsied 
brains, racial species of body lice, and, by the end of the 
century, over 5,000 measut:ements on the skull alone 
(Gossett 1963:69-83). Yet if pure and fixed racial types 
did exist in nature, such differences proved frustratingly 
difficult to measure. 
But measurements were also used by the critics of 
scientific racism. While British and American scholars of 
this period celebrated the Anglo-Saxon race and the 
Teutonic origins of democracy (Gossett 1963 :84-122, 310-
38), the Gennans were captivated with the myth of Aryan 
(national) purity. Attempting to discredit both Aryanism 
and a French anthropologist's claim that the Prussians were 
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really an alien, Slavo-Finnish race, the German pathologist 
and statesman Rudolph Virchow ( 1821-1902) arranged an 
anthropometric survey of 6. 7 million German school 
children. His results, published in 1886, found that they fell 
short of the Aryan ideal. Real German children seemed to 
be of mixed origins, for they were not predominately 
blonde, blue-eyed, or fair-skinned. Yet Virchow's results 
had little impact upon the Aryan ideology (Shipman 
1994:99-100; Stepan 1982:101). 
One ofVrrchow's former students, anthropologist Franz 
Boas (1858-1942) arranged a similar 1908-10 anthropo-
metric survey for the U.S. Immigration Commission, which 
was then concerned with the hordes of"inferior" immigrant 
types from Southern and Eastern Europe who threatened 
to overwhelm the more refined, but less prolific, "Native 
Americans" (i.e., Nordic types) from Northwestern Eu-
rope. Such concerns, later popularized in at least eight 
editions of Madison Grant's The Passing of the Great Race 
( 1916), were also shared by supporters of Charles B. 
Davenport's influential American eugenics (literally, "good 
breeding") movement, and were substantially similar to 
those of its German counterpart, the ominously entitled 
Society for Racial Hygiene (Shipman 1995:122-30; 
Shanklin 1994:82-89). 
Boas surveyed nearly 18,000 recent immigrants and their 
children, and measured, among other things, head length 
and breadth. Head form was then considered a fixed racial 
trait, but Boas reported in 1911 that each successive 
American child born to round-headed, Russian Jewish 
immigrants was progressively more long-headed, while 
those born to long-headed Southern Italian immigrants 
became progressively more round-headed. Boas concluded 
that if such a supposedly fixed racial trait could change in 
a single generation, "we must speak of a plasticity (as 
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opposed to a permanence) of types" (Boas 1940:71; 
Stocking 1968:175-82). In other words, his measurements 
contradicted the usual view of immigrants as fixed racial 
types. 
But Boas had as much influence upon the preconceived 
ideas of the eugenicists and the Immigration Commission 
as Virchow had on the German notion of Aryan purity. 
Madison Grant accused Boas, a secular Jew from Ger-
many, of leading a Jewish conspiracy to discredit the 
scientific fact of fixed racial types (Shanklin 1994:82). 
Grant and Davenport soon dominated the National Re-
search Council's Committee on Anthropology, and, 
disturbed. by Boas's professionalization of anthropology, 
together founded the Galton Society for the study of"racial 
anthropology" by ''Native Americans, who are anthropo-
logically, socially, and politically sound, no Bolsheviki [i .e., 
Jews] need apply" (Shanklin 1994:87; Stocking 1968:287-. 
90). Given the prevailing social climate and the sensational 
findings of the Army intelligence tests, the Immigration 
Restriction Act passed in 1924. 
Bad ideas never die, and American racism was given a 
new lease on life in 1916 with the perfection of the 
Stanford-Binet intelligence scale. It purported to offer an 
objective means of measuring iJU)ate. intelligence, and, with 
the testing of 1. 7 5 million Army inductees in 1917, soon 
yielded data confirming the popular suspicion that non-
white and foreign-born Americans were less intellig~nt, ·and 
that immigration restrictions were badly overdue (Bennett 
1963:363-69; Gould 1981:146-234). 
Nearly fifty years later, inspired by Sir Cyril Burt's bogus 
studies of twins (Kamin 1974; Stepan 1982:181-88), 
psychologist Arthur R. Jensen (1969) argued that the lower 
average IQ score of black Americans . is an accurate 
reflection of an hereditary (i.e. , racial) trait. One obvious 
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problem with his thesis is the unstated assumption that 
black Americans, 20 to 30 percent of whose genes came 
from European and Native American populations, are a 
discrete biological population. His other problematic 
assumptions--that intelligence is largely fixed by birth, that 
IQ tests accurately measure intelligence, and that one can 
use an explanation of IQ differences among whites to 
explain IQ differences between blacks and whites--are all 
examined at greater lengt~ by Stephen Jay Gould 
(1977:243-47; 1981:156-57, 24-320). These same errone-
ous, if unstated, assumptions have reappeared in Richard J. 
Herrnstein and Charles Murray's The Bell Curve (1994), 
which argues that race and class differences are genetically 
determined and immutable (Gould 1994a). 
By the 1930s, it had become increasingly awkward for 
American anthropologists to talk about human diversity in 
terms of the nineteenth century concept of race, racial 
hierarchies, and racial determinism. By the end of World 
War II it was virtually impossible. Boas had examined 
these issues in his The Mind of Primitive Man (1911)--or 
Kultur und Rasse (1914) in the German edition--and 
concluded that the physical features used to define fixed 
racial types are not fixed, and do not in any way correlate 
with such socially acquired habits as culture, language or 
styles of thought. Except at Harvard and the Smithsonian, 
Boas dominated academic anthropology in America, but 
the debunking of race and racial determinism then was as 
much a part of British biology as of American cultural 
anthropology (Barkan 1992; Stepan 1982: 140-81 ). So the 
physical anthropologists who still insisted that race really 
meant something fell back upon the idea of races as major 
geographical stocks. 
There were at least three such major stocks: the Cauca-
soids (Europeans), Mongoloids (Asians and Native Ameri-
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cans), and the Negroids (Africans). The main problem with 
this approach is the interesting anomalies which it creates, 
peoples who just do not conveniently fit into the available 
categories, such as the Australian aborigines--tall, dark-
skinned (a Negroid trait) peoples with some high frequen-
cies (50 to 100 percent) of wavy blonde hair (a Caucasoid 
trait); the Ainus of northern Japan--short, light-skinned 
people with (Caucasoid) beak-like noses and abundant 
facial hair; ·and the San ("Bushmen") of the Kalahari 
Desert--short, yellow to copper-colored people with 
peppercorn curls of head hair, and (Mongoloid) wide cheek 
bones and epicanthic eye folds ("almond-shaped" eyes). 
These and other anomalous peoples were usually explained 
away in terms of the migration and mixings of the major 
geographical stocks. Thus, the Australian aborigines 
presumably represented some crossing between the Ne-
groid and Caucasoid stocks. Yet in none of these cases 
was there any other evidence for these supposed migrations 
and mixings. 
Stanley Gam (1969) tried to rescue. this approach by 
marrying it to populational genetics. He defined a race as 
a Mendelian breeding population, one that thus differs from 
other populations in its frequency of one or more genetic 
traits. But his resulting scheme of nested racial divisions--
nine geographical races, broken down into a host of local 
races, and their constituent, neighborhood micro races--is 
just as arbitrary as, if much more complicated than, any 
other system of racial classification. 
Finally, by 1950, the evolutionary biologists joined the 
anthropological attack on race, arguing that subspecies 
categories are categories of convenience rather than facts 
of nature (Gould 1977:231-36). The three main biological 
problems with the concept of race are as follows: 
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1. Races are arbitrarily defined. There is no agreement 
on which or how many traits best define a race. The more 
traits one selects to define a given race, the smaller that 
race becomes; and, as Stanley Gam's work suggests, the 
fewer people included in a given race, the greater number 
of races one needs to define. 
2. No supposed racial category has exclusive possession 
of a given genetic trait. The fact that we are a single 
species means that humans have always mated with their 
neighbors, and they with theirs. Thus, as Blumenbach and 
Darwin had anticipated, the fonn or frequency of any given 
genetic trait is gradually distributed over the face of the 
earth in what biologists call a cline. And because humans 
have always mated with their neighbors to produce these 
clinal variations, pure, fixed racial types have never existed 
among modem humans--at least not outside peoples' 
minds.-
None of us would have any difficulty distinguishing 
between native Swedes and Japanese. They appear to be 
distinct racial types. But if one looks at all the peoples 
who live between them, it is not at all clear where a 
European-Asian boundary line should be drawn, nor why 
one would want to draw such a line. Or consider this 
comparison of people with dogs. Both are domesticated 
species with worldwide distributions, and both come in all 
sorts of sizes, shapes, and colors. And just as the ordinary 
dogs of the world are mutts, rather than the distinct breeds 
which humans have artificially created, people do not come 
pre-packaged in pure, distinct racial types. 
3. Because human genetic traits are distributed in clines, 
the range of genetic variation within a supposed racial 
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category is greater than those between supposed racial 
categories. Though he was blind to the fact, Samuel 
Morton's data on racial cranial capacities demonstrated this 
back in 1839. Indeed, a classic study by Harvard geneticist 
Richard Lewontin (1972) examined the distribution of 
seventeen polymorphic traits, like those for blood group 
types, among the equivalent .of seven geographical races 
and found that only 6 percent of these variations were 
distributed along racial lines. In other words, 94 percent of 
the variations he studied did not sort themselves out into 
neat, discrete geographical races. This is why the scientific 
racists of the nineteenth century were never able to find 
measurable data which would yield objective racial types. 
Human beings are a geographically variable species. 
That is a fact of nature, while "races" are not (Gould 
1977:231-36). Biological races are descriptive representa-
tions of human physical diversity. They are, at best, very 
rough approxiffiations of that reality, for the static catego-
ries of distinct racial types can never capture the dynamic 
realities of human sizes, shapes arid colors. Using racial 
categories to represent these dynamic realities is like using 
a box of Crayola crayons to capture the wide range of 
color hues, satur;ttions and intensities found in nature. So 
why bother naming races at all? 
The concept of race conveys little or no information 
that could not be expressed in terms of the distribution 
of individual traits among populations. Furthermore, 
racial classification can interfere with the objective 
study of variation. It can create a mental set in which 
evolutionary theories for which there is little justifica-
tion are uncritically accepted. It can also cause people 
to waste time finding pseudosolutions to nonproblems-
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-ways to make this or that population "fit" --while 
ignoring real problems, such as why a given variation 
shows the variation that it does. Of course, it is possi-
ble that there really are major divisions of humankind, 
distinguishable on the basis of unbiased estimates of 
generalized genetic distance among populations. As 
yet, however, the existence of such groupings has not 
been satisfactorily demonstrated. And until it is, we 
would do best to avoid "racial" classificati9ns of all 
kinds (Jolly & Plog 1982:411). 
Still, a lot of people believe the self-evident physical 
differences between humans require a word like "race" to 
describe them. And though anthropologists have tried 
debunking the concept of race for more than sixty years, 
racial l~bels are a social fact. Biological races, I have 
argued, cannot be defined and do not exist. But, however 
misleading and harmful, social races remain a convenient 
way to order the complexity of social life. Most of the 
racial labels used today refer to ethnicity, and are best 
understood as such. For a social race is not a primordial 
social fact, but a situationally defined, collective social 
identity; an historically grounded sense of peoplehood 
based upon insiders' and outsiders' interpretations of 
subjective boundary markers. In short, a social race is an 
ethnic group. 
Relatively little harm is done when "race" is used as a 
descriptive device-a way to tell where a person's ancestors 
came from, or what she/he looks like. The real danger lies 
in using "race" as an explanatory device in assuming that a 
person thjnks, feels, or acts in a certain way because of 
where his or her ancestors came from, or because of what 
sqe/he looks like, for that hearkens back to the erroneous 
nineteenth century view of fixed racial types and racially · 
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determined behavioral traits. Personally, I would prefer 
that we abandon the hopelessly misleading word, "race." 
Meanwhile, we had best be careful about how that word is 
used. 
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